The Crime of Torture and the International Criminal Tribunals by Schabas, William A.
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 37 | Issue 2
2006
The Crime of Torture and the International
Criminal Tribunals
William A. Schabas
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
William A. Schabas, The Crime of Torture and the International Criminal Tribunals, 37 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 349 (2006)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/11
THE CRIME OF TORTURE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS
William A. Schabas t
Torture has held a prominent place in the list of international crimes
since the Commission on Responsibilities, which was established at the
Paris Peace Conference in 1919, listed "torture of civilians" as the third of
thirty-two distinct violations of the "laws and customs of war", immediately
following "murder and massacres; systematic terrorism" and "putting hos-
tages to death".' According to its authors, this early list of international
crimes was prepared in light of "explicit regulations", "established customs"
and "the clear dictates of humanity", 2 although at the time there was no
formal codification of such acts in an international treaty. One of the early
guides to such "dictates of humanity" was the instrument prepared for and
proclaimed by President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, drafted by
Colombia University professor Francis Lieber. Article 16 of the famous
Lieber Code declared: "Military necessity does not admit of cruelty-that
is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of
maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. 3
The Versailles Treaty led to only a handful of prosecutions, taken
before the German courts rather than allied military tribunals, as had origi-
nally been planned.4 Some of the cases involved ill-treatment of prisoners
of war. The following account appears in one of the reported decisions:
t Professor of Human Rights Law, National University of Ireland, Galway and Director,
Irish Centre for Human Rights.
COMMISSION ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS OF THE WAR AND ON
ENFORCEMENT OF PENALTIES: REPORT PRESENTED TO THE PRELIMINARY PEACE CONFERENCE
(1919), reprinted in Div. OF INT'L LAW, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, PAMPHLET
No. 32, VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR: REPORTS OF MAJORITY AND
DISSENTING REPORTS OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION OF
RESPONSIBILITIES, CONFERENCE OF PARIS 1919 17 (1919), and in 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 114
(1920).
2 Id., reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT'LL 95, 113 (1920).
3 ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, U.S. WAR DEP'T,, GEN. ORDERS No. 100, INSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD art. 16 (1863), re-
printed in 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 158, 161 (Leon Friedman ed.,
1972) (presenting the document known as the Lieber Code, which was prepared by Francis
Lieber, LL.D., and revised by a board of officers).
4 See generally JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND
DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1982); SHELDON
GLUECK, WAR CRIMINALS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT 19-36 (1944).
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In at least two cases the accused ordered prisoners to be bound to posts. In
the first case, which he himself admits, this was done to a man whom he
suspected of having been a ringleader in an intended mutiny. The accused
asserts that he made this man stand for about 10 minutes and ordered all
the others to march past him; this being intended as a warning to the others
The accused admits that there may have been a second case of tying a
prisoner to a post, but he will not call it to mind more precisely .... It is
possible that there were several such incidents as the several descriptions
vary a good deal from each other. But only one case can, however, be held
to be proved. Biela has given evidence that in this case, the accused or-
dered the prisoners to be tied up for three days, two hours each day, and
that the accused himself showed Biela how it was to be done. Biela then
modified the severity of the punishment, entirely on his own accord, and
omitted the third day's tying up altogether.
It has not been established that in these cases the accused either ordered or
allowed that these prisoners should be so tied up that they were compelled
to gaze continuously in the sun. If anything of the kind actually took place,
it may have been because the non-commissioned officers or soldiers who
carried out the order acted on their own responsibility; there is no proof
that the accused had any knowledge of it. However, even without this in-
human method of carrying out the order, the tying up remains a very se-
vere measure which cannot be justified in any way. This form of service
punishment was done away with by an Imperial decree of 26th May, 1917,
and certain remarks of the accused seem to show that this decree, which
had been duly published and was much discussed, was not unknown to
him. He probably ordered this tying up, not so much as a punishment but
rather as a means of securing order generally and of putting a stop to in-
subordination. Of this, however, so far as the court can see, there was no
reasonable fear, and the employment of this severe measure cannot be con-
sidered otherwise than as a case of ill-treatment under the conditions then
obtaining. 5
Emil Miller was sentenced to forty-five days imprisonment for these acts.
Other abuses against British prisoners brought his total sentence to six
months.6 The Commission of Allied jurists set up to examine the results of
what were known as the Liepzig Trials concluded that "in the case of those
condemned the sentences were not adequate." 7
5 In re Muller, translated in 16 AM. J. INT'L L 684, 688-89 (1922) (presenting the deci-
sion of the German "Court of the 2d Criminal Senate of the Imperial Court of Justice," May
30, 1921, in the case of Emil Muller, a German officer who commanded a prisoner of war
camp during World War I and was accused of abusing prisoners).
6 Id. at 696.
7 HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE LAWS OF WAR 48 (United Nations War Crimes Comm'n ed. 1948).
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The Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which formed
the legal basis of the great Nuremberg trial, did not explicitly refer to "tor-
ture," either as a war crime or as a crime against humanity. 8 There are occa-
sional references to torture in the judgment of the Tribunal, which was is-
sued on September 30 through October 1, 1946. For example, in explaining
the inadmissibility of a defense of superior orders, the judges said: "That a
soldier was ordered to kill or torture in violation of the international law of
war has never been recognised as a defense to such acts of brutality . . .9
The judgment also declared that "[p]risoners of war were ill-treated and
tortured and murdered, not only in defiance of the well-established rules of
international law, but in complete disregard of the elementary dictates of
humanity."' "Civilian populations in occupied territories suffered the same
fate."" Under the rubric "Persecution of the Jews," the Tribunal heard evi-
dence that in the concentration and extermination camps "[b]eating, starva-
tion, torture, and killing were general."
1 2
A reference to torture was included in the definition of crimes
against humanity comprised within Control Council Law No. 10, which was
adopted in December, 1945, for the purpose of governing prosecutions that
were subsequent to those overseen by the International Military Tribunal
and were carried out under the auspices of allied military tribunals and
German national courts. 13 In addition to making torture a crime, this defini-
tion also expanded on the provisions of the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal by including rape and imprisonment. 14
It was this more expansive enumeration of acts of crimes against
humanity, including torture, found in Control Council Law No. 10, that was
drawn upon by the United Nations Security Council when it adopted the
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
8 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, in Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, annex art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 82
U.N.T.S. 279. See also Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 5,
Jan. 19, 1946, amended by General Orders No. 20, Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, re-
printed in 8 DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 354 (Raymond Dennett &
Robert K. Turner eds., 1948).
9 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences (Oct. 1, 1946),
reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 221 (1947).
0 Id. at 225.
1 Id.
12 Id. at 247, 285.
13 Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes,
Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity art 2, § l(c), Dec. 20, 1945, 3 Official Gazette
Control Council for Germany 50-55 (1946).
14 Id.
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("ICTY" or "Yugoslavia Tribunal").' 5 The Security Council also listed "tor-
ture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments" as a grave
breach of the Geneva Conventions, 16 drawing upon provisions in those in-
struments. 17 In his report preliminary to the adoption of the ICTY Statute,
the Secretary-General indicated that in his view the crimes within the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal were all then recognised "beyond any
doubt" as incurring individual criminal responsibility under customary in-
ternational law. 18 Prior to adopting the ICTY Statute, the Security Council
had been informed of acts of torture being committed during the conflict in
the former Yugoslavia.' 9
A year later, the Security Council included the act of torture as a
crime against humanity in the somewhat modified definition found in the
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"). 20 The
Security Council also listed torture as a war crime, under the heading "Vio-
lations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional
Protocol II.,,2 1 According to the Secretary-General's report, issued subse-
quent to the adoption of the ICTR Statute:
... [T]he Security Council has elected to take a more expansive approach
to the choice of the applicable law than the one underlying the statute of
the Yugoslav Tribunal, and included within the subject-matter jurisdiction
of the Rwanda Tribunal international instruments regardless of whether
'5 S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). The Secretary-General, Report of
the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 1
47 & art. 5, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter Secretary-General Report] (mak-
ing reference to the provision of Law No. 10 of the Control Council for Germany relating to
crimes against humanity and including torture, rape, and imprisonment among enumerated
crimes against humanity).
16 Secretary-General Report, supra note 15, art. 2(b).
17 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 51, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 130, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention on POW's]; Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.ST. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
18 Secretary-General Report, supra note 15, 34-35.
19 Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/25274 (Feb. 9, 1993).
20 S.C. Res. 955, annex, art. 4, UN Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
21 Id. Provisions that are essentially identical to those of the Rwanda Statute dealing with
torture were also incorporated in the statute of the most recent of the international criminal
tribunals, the Special Court for Sierra Leone. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, arts. 2-3, in Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra
Leone on the Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, annex, Jan. 16, 2002.
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they were considered part of customary international law or whether they
have customarily entailed the individual criminal responsibility of the per-
petrator of the crime. Article 4 of the statute, accordingly, includes viola-
tions of Additional Protocol II, which, as a whole, has not yet been univer-
sally recognized as part of customary international law, and for the first
time criminalizes common article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions. 22
Doubts about the state of customary international law were soon
laid to rest by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia. In perhaps its most important ruling, on October
2, 1995, the Appeals Chamber determined that, under customary interna-
tional law, crimes against humanity could be committed in peacetime and
that war crimes were punishable when committed in non-international
armed conflict.23 These findings are of direct relevance to the international
criminalisation of torture, which was already acknowledged to be a crime
against humanity as well as a war crime, but only in a narrow ambit. On a
narrow reading of the law, relying on the Nuremberg case law and interna-
tional humanitarian law treaties, it had been contended that the crime
against humanity of torture could only be committed in association with
armed conflict, and indeed this is what Article 5 of the ICTY Statute
seemed to confirm. Similarly, the traditional view that war crimes could
only be committed in international armed conflict would have excluded
torture prosecutions with respect to civil wars. The conclusions of the Ap-
peals Chamber rejecting such restrictive interpretations were subsequently
endorsed in the final text of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court. 24 This provides added confirmation as to the state of customary in-
ternational law.
22 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of
Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), 12, U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 (Feb. 13, 1995).
Slightly more than a decade later, a United Nations Commission of Inquiry referred to the
Secretary-General's remarks at the time the ICTR Statute was being adopted, pointing out
that no member of the Security Council objected to the "expansive approach" that he had
taken. This "demonstrat[ed] consensus on the need to make headway in the legal regulation
of internal conflict and to criminalize deviations from the applicable law." See Report of the
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General
160 (Jan. 25, 2005). The Commission suggested that the recognition by the Security Council
that violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II were punishable was in itself
sufficient to push these two categories into the realm of customary international law. Id.
23 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocu-
tory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70 (Oct. 2, 1995) (indicating that "International humanitarian
law applies ... and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of
peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved.").
24 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 7-8, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute]. See also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 12 (2d ed. 2004).
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The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which was
adopted on July 17, 1998, before the ad hoc tribunals had yet provided any
significant judicial interpretation of the term "torture, 25 included the act in
its enumeration of crimes against humanity together with a definition:
"'Torture' means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the con-
trol of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions., 26 The
Rome Statute also lists torture as a war crime when committed in both in-
ternational and non-international armed conflict.27
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF "TORTURE"
Less than two months after the adoption of the Rome Statute, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda issued a landmark judgment,
convicting bourgmestre ("mayor") Jean-Paul Akayesu of, inter alia, the
crime against humanity of torture, which was listed in Article 4 of the Tri-
bunal's Statute. 28 Akayesu was involved in several episodes of torture. One
case involved one of his employees, identified in the proceedings as Wit-
ness K or Victim U. A Tutsi woman married to a Hutu man, Victim U
worked as an accountant in the office of the bureau communal in Taba. She
attended at her office on April 19, 1994 at the request of Akayesu, where
she found him "changed in mood and in temper.
29
... She said he asked her why she had not been coming to work and she
told him that she was afraid and had come only at his request. After then
witnessing the killing of Tutsi at the bureau communal, which she said was
ordered by the Accused, Witness K said the killers asked the Accused why
she had not been killed as well. She said he told them that they were going
to kill her after questioning her about the secrets of the Inkotanyi. Accord-
ing to Witness K, the Accused then took her keys, locked her in her office
and left, saying he was going to search for Ephrem Karangwa, the Inspec-
tor of Judicial Police.
The Accused returned, said Witness K, with other men whom she referred
to as "killers", and they questioned her. She said they asked her to explain
how she was cooperating with the Inkotanyi, which she denied. She said
25 Tadid was found responsible for acts of torture by a Trial Chamber of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in May 1997, but these were more or less sub-
sumed within other acts of "cruel treatment," and the judgment of the Trial Chamber does
not provide a discussion of the elements of the crime. See Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-
94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (May 7, 1997).
26 ICC Statute, supra note 23, art. 7(2)(e).
27 Id. arts. 8(2)(a)(ii), 8(2)(c)(i).
28 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998).
29 Id. 1387.
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the Accused insisted and said that if she did not tell them how she worked
with the Inkotanyi, they would kill her. After further discussion, she said
the Accused again threatened her, saying she should tell them what she
knew or they would kill her, and then left. At this time she estimated it was
about three o'clock in the afternoon. Witness K testified that the Accused
returned at around midnight with a police officer and asked her whether
she had decided to tell them what she knew. When she said she knew noth-
ing, she said he told her, "I wash my hands of your blood." She said he
then told her to leave the office and go home and when she expressed con-
cern about the late hour, he asked the driver and the police to accompany
her home. 3
0
The Trial Chamber found that the interrogation by Akayesu of Victim U,
under threat to her life, constituted torture. 31 Akayesu was found guilty of
torture with respect to several other similar interrogations involving threats
and, in some cases, great brutality. 2 In its legal findings, the Trial Chamber
offered a definition of torture:
The Tribunal interprets the word "torture", as set forth in Article 3(f) of its
Statute, in accordance with the definition of torture set forth in the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment, that is "any act by which severe pain or suf-
fering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or
is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an of-
ficial capacity". 33
The Tribunal also said that it considered that acts of torture could also be
addressed under the crime of genocide, which makes punishable the causing
of serious bodily or mental harm to members of a national, ethnic, racial or
religious group. On this point, it referred to the celebrated Eichmann case,
in which Israeli courts held that serious bodily or mental harm could be
caused "by the enslavement, starvation, deportation and persecution [...] and
by detention in ghettos, transit camps and concentration camps in conditions
which were designed to cause their degradation, deprivation of their rights
30 Id. 7 387-88.
3t Id. T 682.
32 Id. 7 682, 684.
33 Id. 681 (quoting Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Con-
vention]).
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as human beings, and to suppress them and cause them inhumane suffering
and torture."
34
In November 1998, a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ventured that institution's first major
consideration of the elements of torture. The case involved abuse of detain-
ees in the Celebici prison camp, administered by Bosnian Muslims in a
town about halfway between Sarajevo and Mostar.35 The Trial Chamber
referred to the various international instruments that prohibit torture, start-
ing with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including two special-
ized instruments, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("Torture Convention") and the
Declaration on the Protection from Torture.36 The Trial Chamber said that
these General Assembly declarations and the various widely-ratified treaty
provisions established that the prohibition of torture was also a norm of
customary law.37 Moreover, it said, that the prohibition of torture was a
norm ofjus cogens, citing as authority for the proposition the United Na-
tions Special Rapporteur for Torture.38 The Trial Chamber noted that "[i]t
should additionally be noted that the prohibition contained in the aforemen-
tioned international instruments is absolute and non-derogable in any cir-
cumstances.,
39
Like the Akayesu Trial Chamber of its sister tribunal, the ICTY
Trial Chamber in Delalk opted to follow the definition of torture in the
1984 Convention, after some discussion about somewhat different defini-
tions found in international legal instruments. 40 The Trial Chamber said the
definition "reflects a consensus which the Trial Chamber considers to be
34 Id 503 (quoting 36 INT'L L. REP. 8 (1968) (summarizing CrimC (Jer) Attorney Gen.
of Isr. v. Eichmann, [1961] IsrDC 45, at 3; CrimA Attorney Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, [1962]
IsrSC 16, at 2033)).
35 Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-2 l-T, Judgment (Nov. 16, 1998).
36 Id. 7 447, 452, 453 (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter Univer-
sal Declaration]; Torture Convention, supra note 33; and Declaration on the Protection from
Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 4, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975)).
31 Id. 447, 454.
38 Id 454 (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331; P. Kooijmans, Report of the Special Rapporteur, 3, delivered to the Com-
mission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15 (Feb. 19, 1986)).
39 Id. 454 (citing Torture Convention, supra note 33, art. 2(2); European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 312
U.N.T.S. 221; Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art.
27(2), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Organization of American
States, Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture art. 5, Dec. 9, 1985,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 67, 25 I.L.M. 519).
40 Prosecutor v. Delali6, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 77 455-60 (Nov. 16, 1998).
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representative of customary international law.",41 The judgment goes on to
explore the distinction between torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment.42 The Trial Chamber referred to the case law of
international human tribunals, lingering on the famous ruling of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights in Ireland v. United Kingdom, which refused
to classify acts of ill treatment carried out in British prisoners in Northern
Ireland as torture.
The Northern Ireland Case best illustrates the inherent difficulties in de-
termining a threshold level of severity beyond which inhuman treatment
becomes torture. Whereas the European Commission of Human Rights
considered that the combined use of wall-standing, hooding, subjection to
noise, sleep deprivation and food and drink deprivation constituted a viola-
tion of article 3 amounting to torture, in this case, the European Court con-
cluded that such acts did not amount to torture as they "did not occasion
suffering of the particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture
as so understood." Instead, the European Court found that the relevant acts
constituted inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of article 3 of the
European Convention. 44
But, as the Trial Chamber observed, the European Court's decision has been
much criticized in the literature and, moreover, not followed in subsequent
cases by other international human rights bodies.45
The Delali6 Trial Chamber also rejected defense arguments that tor-
ture was confined to acts committed in pursuit of a limited list of prohibited
purposes, concluding that the infliction of severe pain or suffering by a pub-
lic official would only escape the charge of torture in exceptional cases
where it could be demonstrated that the torture acted for purely private rea-
sons. 
4 6
On the symbolic date of December 10, 1998, which was the fiftieth
anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
by the United Nations General Assembly, 47 a Trial Chamber of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia convicted Anto Fu-
rund~ija of the crime of torture. 48 The case involved a single act of torture
41 Id. 1459.
42 Id. $$ 461-72.
43 Id. 463 (quoting Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978)).
44 Id. 463 (quoting Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978)).
41 Id. 7 464-68.
46 Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, $ 470-72 (Nov. 16, 1998).
47 See Universal Declaration, supra note 36. Article 5 of the Universal Declaration states:
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment." Id.
48 Prosecutor v. Furundija, Case No. IT-95-17/I-T, Judgment (Dec. 10, 1998).
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of a female prisoner. Lacking the "widespread or systematic attack" element
that customary law has determined to be one of the contextual elements of
crimes against humanity, Anto Furund~ija was prosecuted for torture as a
war crime. 49 The charges concerned acts committed at the headquarters of
the "Jokers," "a special unit within the armed forces of the Croatian Com-
munity of Herzeg-Bosna, known as the Croatian Defence Council
("HVO"). 5 ° Anto Furund~ija was its local commander. On or about May
15, 1993, Furundlija and another member of the group questioned a female
Muslim civilian. 5' Furund~ija was apparently trying to obtain a list of
names and information about the activities of her sons.52 During the ques-
tioning-which took place in the presence of a large number of soldiers-
Furundzija's associate forced the woman to undress, and then rubbed a
knife against her inner thigh and lower stomach, threatening to put it inside
her vagina if she would not tell the truth.5 a The woman was taken to another
room where Furund~ija continued to interrogate her, as well as a male cap-
tive who had already been badly beaten. 54 While this was going on, Fu-
rund~ija's partner beat both individuals on the feet with a baton, then forced
the woman to have oral and vaginal intercourse with him, and to "lick his
penis clean" when it was over. 55 Furundiija was present and did nothing to
stop the sexual assault.56
Concluding that the prohibition of torture was a customary rule, the
Trial Chamber cited a number of treaty provisions that it said had "ripened"
into customary rules because they had been ratified by practically all States,
a fact "highly indicative of the attitude of States to the prohibition of tor-
ture."'57 Moreover, the Trial Chamber indicated that "no State [had] ever
claimed that it was authorized to practice torture in time of armed conflict..
* ,,8 Finally, the International Court of Justice, in the Nicaragua case, had
held that common Article 3-which prohibits torture-was a customary
norm. 59 Consequently, said the Trial Chamber, it seems "incontrovertible
that torture in time of armed conflict is prohibited by a general rule of inter-
49 id.
50 Id. 2.
5' Id. 25.
52 Id. 40.
53 Id.
54 Prosecutor v. Furund~ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 41 (Dec. 10, 1998).
55 Id. 87.
56 Id.
57 Id. 138.
58 Id.
59 Id
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national law.",60 The Trial Chamber added that State responsibility for acts
of torture could also ensue, in addition to issues of individual criminal li-
ability.
6 1
In addition to the prohibition of torture by international humanitar-
ian law, the ICTY Trial Chamber also noted that torture was prohibited by
international human rights law.62 Moreover, it is both a peremptory or jus
cogens norm63 and an erga omnes norm. 64 Furundija held that the prohibi-
tion of torture has:
... [E]volved into a peremptory norm orjus cogens, that is, a norm that
enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even
"ordinary" customary rules. The most conspicuous consequence of this
higher rank is that the principle at issue cannot be derogated from by
States through international treaties or local or special customs or even
general customary rules not endowed with the same normative force.65
But this point, while interesting and comforting, and developed extensively
in the judgment, seems of little or no relevance to the issue of whether tor-
ture is a crime subsumed within the violations of the laws and customs of
war6 set out in Article 3 of the Statute. The Trial Chamber noted that the
6importance that the international community attaches to the protection of
individuals from torture& extends to potential breaches. 66
The Furundija Trial Chamber endorsed the conclusions of the
Trial Chamber in Delali concerning the elements of the crime of torture,
but produced some additional legal arguments in support. 67 It listed five
elements of the war crime of torture:
[T]orture (i) consists of the infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental; in addition (ii) this act or omission
must be intentional; (iii) it must aim at obtaining information or a confes-
sion, or at punishing, intimidating, humiliating or coercing the victim or a
third person, or at discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a
third person; (iv) it must be linked to an armed conflict; (v) at least one of
the persons involved in the torture process must be a public official or
60 Prosecutor v. Furundlija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 139 (Dec. 10, 1998).
61 Id. 142.
62 Id. 1143.
63 Id. 144, 153-56 (citing numerous supporting documents and cases).
64 Id. 151-52.
65 Id.
66 Prosecutor v. Furundija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 148 & n.168 (Dec. 10,
1998) (citing Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1989)).
67 Id. 1160.
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must at any rate act in a non-private capacity, e.g. as a de facto organ of a
State or any other authority-wielding entity.
68
The elements proposed in Furundgia differ slightly from the lan-
guage of Article 1(1) of the Torture Convention.69 Thus, the Trial Chamber
did not reproduce the word "severe" prior to "pain or suffering." With re-
spect to the purposes of torture, the Trial Chamber added the word "hu-
miliation," explaining in the text of the judgment why this concept is so
important:
As is apparent from this enumeration of criteria, the Trial Chamber con-
siders that among the possible purposes of torture one must also include
that of humiliating the victim. This proposition is warranted by the general
spirit of international humanitarian law: the primary purpose of this body
of law is to safeguard human dignity. The proposition is also supported by
some general provisions of such important international treaties as the Ge-
neva Conventions and Additional Protocols, which consistently aim at pro-
tecting persons not taking part, or no longer taking part, in the hostilities
from "outrages upon personal dignity." The notion of humiliation is, in
any event close to the notion of intimidation, which is explicitly referred to
in the Torture Convention's definition of torture. 
70
These "adjustments" to the definition of torture were not, however, con-
firmed in the Elements of Crimes ("the Elements") adopted by the Assembly
of States Parties of the International Criminal Court. The text in the Ele-
ments dealing with torture, inspired by article 1(1) of the Torture Conven-
tion, precisely tracks the text of that instrument. 7' Moreover, subsequent
decisions of the Yugoslavia Tribunal have distanced themselves from the
broad approach taken in Furundija. In Krnojelac, for example, a Trial
Chamber said torture intended to "humiliate" the victim was not within the
68 Id. 162.
69 Torture Convention, supra note 33, art. 1(1).
70 Id. (quoting Geneva Convention on POW's, supra note 15, art. 3(1)(c); Protocol Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Vic-
tims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 75(2)(b), Dec. 12, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 4; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 4(2)(e),
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609) (noting that the phrase "outrages upon personal dignity"
is common to articles 3(1)(c) of the Geneva Conventions, supra note 15).
71 Torture Convention, supra note 33; Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(a)(ii)-l, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 3-
10, 2002). But note that "humiliation" is addressed by the war crime of "outrages upon per-
sonal dignity." Id. art. 8(2)(c)(ii.). "Humiliation" could also be addressed as the crime against
humanity of "persecution" or that of "other inhumane acts." Id. art. 7(1)(h), (k).
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Tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction because it is not mentioned in any of
the principal international instruments prohibiting torture.72
The early rulings confirmed that at least one of the perpetrators of
torture must be a public official or, at any rate, someone not acting in a pri-
vate capacity; that is, that it be "committed by, or at the instigation of, or
with the consent or acquiescence of, an official or other person acting in an
official capacity." 73 This view was based on the inclusion of this criterion
within the definition of torture in the Torture Convention. But more recent
decisions have said this is not a requirement of the crime of torture under
customary international law. 74 In Kvoika, an ICTY Trial Chamber ex-
plained that "the state actor requirement imposed by international human
rights law is inconsistent with the application of individual criminal respon-
sibility for international crimes found in international humanitarian law and
international criminal law."
75
It is the severity of the pain or suffering inflicted in the case of tor-
ture that sets it apart from similar offences. In assessing the seriousness of
such mistreatment, it has been held that the objective severity of the harm
inflicted must first be assessed. 76 Then, the tribunal should consider subjec-
tive criteria, such as the physical or mental effect of the treatment upon the
particular victim and, in some cases, factors such as the victim's age, sex, or
state of health. 77 According to one ICTY Trial Chamber:
72 Prosecutor v. Kmojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, 186 (Mar. 15, 2002).
73 Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 7 494-96 (Nov. 16, 1998). See
also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 77 593-95, 681 (Sept. 2,
1998); Prosecutor v. Furund~ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 162 (Dec. 10, 1998);
Prosecutor v. Furund~ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment, 111 (July 21, 2000).
74 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, 148 (June 12, 2002); Krno-
jelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, 187.
75 Prosecutor v. Kvo~ka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, 139 (Nov. 2, 2001) (citing
ICC Statute, supra note 22, art. 7(2)(e)). See also. Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-
97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence, IT 342-43 (May 15, 2003) (citing Akayesu, Case No.
ICTR-96-4-T, 593-95; Torture Convention, supra note 33; Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-
A, 146-48; Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, T 140; Prosecutor v. Furund~ija, Case No. IT-
95-17/1-T, Judgment, 162 (Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Delalik, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Judgment, 470 (Nov. 16, 1998); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-
23/1-T, Judgment, 486 (Feb. 22, 2001)); Prosecutor v. Kvo~ka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A,
Judgment, 280-84 (Feb. 28, 2005).(citing Brief of Appellant, Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-
30/1-A, M 112, 120-21, 127; Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, 138, 139, 141; Brief of
Respondent, Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, I 5.107, 5.112-5.134, Kunarac, Case No. IT-
96-23/1-A, 148).
76 Kvoka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, 7 143.
77 Id. T$ 142-43 (citing Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 7 162, 167
(1978); Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21T, 468-69; U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Gen-
eral Comment No. 20: Replaces General Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition of Torture and
Cruel Treatment or Punishment (Art. 7), 4, U.N. Doc. A/47/40, annex 6 (Apr. 3, 1992)).
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In assessing the seriousness of the acts charged as torture, the Trial Cham-
ber must take into account all the circumstances of the case, including the
nature and context of the infliction of pain, the premeditation and institu-
tionalisation of the ill-treatment, the physical condition of the victim, the
manner and method used, and the position of inferiority of the victim. 78
"[T]he extent that an individual has been mistreated over a prolonged period
of time" will also be relevant. 79 Although torture often causes permanent
damage to the health of its victims, permanent injury is not a required ele-
ment of the crime. 80 The mental suffering of an individual forced to watch
severe mistreatment of a relative could reach the level of gravity required
for the crime of torture. In Kvoka, a Trial Chamber wrote: "[B]eing forced
to watch serious sexual attacks inflicted on a female acquaintance was tor-
ture for the forced observer. The presence of onlookers, particularly family
members, also inflicts severe mental harm amounting to torture on the per-
son being raped.'
Perhaps the most striking example of torture in the case law of the
international tribunals concerns rape. The first to link rape and torture was
the Trial Chamber of the ICTR in Akayesu: "Like torture rape is a violation
of personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when inflicted by or
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity., 82 Its views were endorsed by
an ICTY Trial Chamber in Delali6.83 That Trial Chamber noted that "[t]he
psychological suffering of persons upon whom rape is inflicted may be ex-
acerbated by social and cultural conditions and can be particularly acute and
long lasting. 84 In its celebrated ruling dealing with the Foca rape camp, the
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia stated:
... [S]ome acts establish per se the suffering of those upon whom they
were inflicted. Rape is obviously such an act .... Sexual violence neces-
sarily gives rise to severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
and in this way justifies its characterisation as an act of torture. Severe
pain or suffering, as required by the definition of the crime of torture, can
78 Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, 182.
79 Id.
80 Kvoika, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, 148.
81 Id. 149 (citing Prosecutor v. Furund~ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 1 267
(Dec. 10, 1998)).
82 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 597 (Sept. 2, 1998).
83 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 1490, 495-97 (Nov. 16, 1998)
(quoting Akayesu, Case No. ICTR -96-4-T, 597).
84 Id. 495.
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thus be said to be established once rape has been proved, since the act of
rape necessarily implies such pain or suffering. 
85
The crime of torture, regrettably, continues to feature in the work of
international criminal tribunals. The initial investigations undertaken by the
International Criminal Tribunal have referred to acts of torture, and it seems
likely that these will soon form the subject matter of prosecutions. For ex-
ample, in one of the files currently opened by the Prosecutor involving the
eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo, victims have inter-
vened and been given standing before the Court on the basis of allegations
that they were tortured8 6 The Commission of Inquiry into Darfur, whose
allegations form the basis of the first Security Council referral to the Inter-
national Criminal Court, 7 also include charges of torture.8 8 For example,
The Commission heard shocking accounts of physical and mental torture
and cruel and degrading treatment to which these detainees had been sub-
jected, and the inhuman conditions of detention in which they were kept.
Most of them were repeatedly beaten, whipped, slapped and, in one case,
kept under the scorching sun for four days. Three of the persons were sus-
pended from the ceiling and beaten, one of them continuously for ten days.
The Commission also met with another individual who had been tortured
by the National Security and Intelligence Service for three days after his
arrest from an "internally displaced persons" camp in Western Darfur. He
stated that he had been suspended from the ceiling and beaten repeatedly.
The Commission saw the scars left on the bodies of those detainees and
prisoners as signs of the torture inflicted on them. In most of the cases tor-
ture, including threats to life and physical integrity, was used to coerce in-
formation or extract confessions. They were blindfolded with their hands
tied whenever they were transported from one place of detention to an-
other, and sometimes food was denied to them for long periods of time. 89
Though universally condemned, the practice of torture remains widespread.
It is even encouraged by some of the great democracies in the name of the
War on Terror, as articles elsewhere in this learned journal explain. The
condemnation of torturers by international criminal tribunals is a most help-
85 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, 149-51 (June 12, 2002)
(citing Prosecutor v. Furundiija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, IT 163, 171 (Dec. 10,
1998); Delali6, Case No. IT-96-2 l-T, IT 480-96).
86 Situation en Rdpublique D6mocratique du Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04, Version
publique expurg6e d6cision sur les demandes de participation A la procddure de VPRS 1,
VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 et VPRS 6, 171-75, 181, 184-85 (Jan. 17, 2006).
87 S.C. Res. 1593, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
88 The Secretary-General, Report of the International Commission ofInquiry on Darfur to
the Secretary-General, 96, 116, 186, 341, 362-74, delivered to the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 31, 2005).
89 Id. 9369.
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ful reminder of the uncompromising position taken by international law.
Hopefully, it is also a deterrent.
